Workmen\u27s Compensation by Kostos, T. Michael
SMU Law Review
Volume 4




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





Texas. The question whether an intervenor has a right to re-
cover reasonable attorney's fees had not been answered satisfac-
torily prior to the Henger Construction case.' The plaintiff had
recovered compensation from the insurance carrier and was suing
the negligent third party. The carrier intervened and asserted its
right to subrogation to the extent of the compensation and net
expenses paid to the plaintiff. It also asserted a right to recover
an attorney's fee. It was held that the intervenor could recover
reasonable attorney's fees out of plaintiff's recovery.
The plaintiff argued that the carrier could recover only when
it had initiated the suit. The court's holding, enunciated through
Mr. Justice Hart, is justifiable, because of three factors: (1) Ar-
ticle 8307, Section 6a, of the REVISED CIVIL STATUTES2 places no
condition upon the right of an intervenor to recover the reasonable
cost of enforcing a third party's liability; (2) Recovery of attor-
ney's fees has been regularly permitted where both the employee
and carrier prosecuted suit against a third party;3 (3) if plain-
tiff's view prevailed, it could well mean that an employee by
hiring an attorney of his own, could prevent an intervening car-
rier from recovering any attorney's fee, even though the carrier's
attorney did substantially all the work. This construction is
recognized in Missouri, which holds "that in any case where the
insurance carrier is a party to the suit against a third party and
'Smith v. Henger Construction Co., -Tex.-, 226 S. W. 2d. 425 (1949).
2 "If compensation be claimed under this law by the injured employee or his legal
beneficiaries, then the association shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured
employee in so far as may be necessary and may enforce in the name of the injured
employee or of his legal beneficiaries or in its own name ... the liability of said other per.
son, and in case the association recovers a sum greater than paid or assumed by the asso-
ciation to the employee or his legal beneficiaries, together with a reasonable cost of
enforcing such liability, which shall be determined by the court trying the case, then
out of the sum so recovered the association shall reimburse itself and pay said cost
and the excess so recovered shall be paid to the injured employee or his beneficiaries."
3 Traders & General Ins. Co. v. West Texas Utilities Co., 140 Tex. 57, 165 S. W. 2d.
713 (1942).
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employs its own attorney, the insurance carrier should be allowed
to recover a reasonable attorney's fee."4 The amount of the fee
is flexible and will be determined by the facts in each case, de-
pending in part on the extent to which the intervenor's attorney
contributes to the successful enforcement of the third party's lia-
bility.
PARTIALLY DEPENDENT PARENTS CAN RECOVER MAXIMUM
PAYMENT FOR DEATH OF EACH SON
Arkansas. The issue of whether partially dependent parents
can recover maximum compensation for the death of each son,
raised in the Grilc case,5 was one of first impression in Arkansas.
The court held that the Workmen's Compensation Commission was
justified in holding that the parents, whether partially or wholly
dependent on each son, were entitled to recover the maximum
weekly award in each case.
The appellant contended that the compensation law did not
intend any result which would multiply maximum payments by
three, simply because three people were killed, each of whom
was contributing equally to the support of the same dependents.
The parents were the only surviving dependents.'
There is a general rule that unless a workmen's compensation
act specifically provides that widow and children shall be pre-
sumed, or are conclusively presumed, to be dependent upon the
father, the dependent may, in the case of death of two or more
of the family contributing to their support, recover compensation
with respect to each.7 However, there is little judicial authority
on the specific question. A Utah case' has held that dependents. are
entitled to the maximum amount of compensation provided for by
4 Wilhelm et al. v. Hersh, 50 S. W. 2d. 735, 739 (Mo. App. 1932).
E. H. Noel Co. v. Grilc, -Ark.- , 221 S. W. 2d. 49 (1949).
EWithin the terms of the workmen's compensation statutes, ARx. STAT. 1947 ANq.
§§ 81-1301--81-1349.
7 See annotation on this point in 45 A.L.R. 894 (1926).
s Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 67 Utah 25. 245 Pac. 381 (1926).
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statute, for each death. In Hodgson v. West Stanley Colliery9 it
was held that where a father and two sons, all killed in one acci-
dent, paid their wages into a common fund for support of their
family, the mother and surviving children were entitled to receive
compensation in respect to the death of each of the deceased. This
was based on the ground that there was no presumption of law
making the widow and children totally dependent on the father,
and not dependent at all on the other two.
In a recent case'" the Arkansas Supreme Court held that it is
well settled that partial dependency is sufficient to justify an award
for compensation and that one is a dependent within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act if one relies for support in
whole or in part upon the aid of another." In the instant case the
court justifiably found that the parents were at least partially
dependent on each of their sons and that they were entitled to re-
cover the maximum compensation for each death.
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO SUPPLY SAFETY DEVICES
New Mexico. In the International Minerals case" the point
raised for the first time was whether mining companies are re-
quired to provide only those safety devices required by the Mine
Safety Act of 1933" in order to escape a 50 per cent penalty to
an injured workman, as originally provided by the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1917, or whether a 1937 amendment re-
quired that they also furnish safety devices in general use in the
s [19101 A. C. 229.
10 Crossett Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 208 Ark. 572, 187 S. W. 2d. 161 (1945).
111 HONNOLD, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (Ist ed. 1917) 232: "The phrase
'actual dependents' means dependents in fact whether wholly or partially dependent.
Hence it was no defense, in proceedings under an act using this term, that petitioner
and his family were not entirely dependent on the deceased. Partial dependency, giv-
ing a right to compensation, may exist, though the contributions be at irregular inter-
vals and of irregular amounts, and though the dependent have other means of support,
and be not reduced to absolute want."
12 Jones v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 53 N. M. 127, 202 P. 2d. 1080
(1949).
"3N. M. Laws, c. 153: N. M. STAT. 1949 ANN. §§ 67-301 et seq.
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industry or suffer such penalty. 4 The court held that the later
penalty section did not apply to the mining industry, for which
specific safety regulations are provided by the Mine Safety Act.
It is to be noted that the penalty is suffered in two instances
by the employer, viz., (a) if injury to, or death of, a workman
results from failure of the employer to provide the safety devices
required by law; or (b) in any industry in which safety devices
are not provided by statute, if injury to, or death of, a workman
results from negligence of the employer in failing to supply rea-
sonable safety devices in general use for the protection of the
workman.
When the New Mexico Legislature enacted the statute in its
present form it had in mind industries of two kinds, namely, (1)
those in which named safety devices are required by law, and (2)
those in which specific safety devices are not required by any
law. As to the former, the penalty was to be incurred only if
death or injury to a workman resulted from an employer's fail-
ure to provide safety devices required by law. As to the latter,
the penalty would be incurred only if death or injury to a work-
man resulted from an employer's negligence in failing to supply
"reasonable safety devices in general use" for the workman's
protection. The court found that the mining industry fell into the
former category, and, therefore, need comply only with the pro-
visions of the Mine Safety Act.
14N. M. Laws 1937, c. 92, § 5 (N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 57-907), amended the
safety device provision of the earlier workmen's compensation act and reads: "In case an
injury to, or death of a workman results from his failure to observe a statutory regu-
lation appertaining to the safe conduct of his employment, or from his failure to use
a safety device provided by his employer, then the compensation otherwise payable
under this act shall be reduced to fifty per centum (50%). In case an injury to, or
death of, a workman results from the failure of the employer to provide safety devices
required by law, or in any industry in which safety devices are not provided by statute,
if an injury to, or death of, a workman results from the negligence of the employer
in failing to supply reasonable safety devices in general use for the use or protection
of a workman, then compensation otherwise payable under this act shall be increased
by fifty per centum (50%). Provided further, that any additional liability resulting
from any such negligence on the part of the employer shall be recoverable from the
employer only and not from the insurer, guarantor, or sureties of said employer under
this act except that this shall not be construed to prohibit employers from insuring
against such additional liability."
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PAYMENTS FOR BOTH TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT DISABILITIES
New Mexico. In Scofield v. Lordsburg Municipal School Dis-
trict of Hidalgo County15 the construction given an amendment
to the Workmen's Compensation Law16 was the principal issue,
and it was one of first impression. The injured employee recovered
compensation at the statutory rate of eighteen dollars per week17
for the period from August 26, 1946, seven days after injury,
to August 13, 1947, for temporary total disability, in addition to
an award in like weekly amounts for 130 weeks for loss of one
leg by amputation above the knee. Defendant's counsel based
their argument that compensation may not be had for both tempo-
rary and permanent disability on an amendment to the controlling
statute which omits the language "compensation consecutively for
each permanent injury.""i It was held by the court that the proper
construction of the statute and amendment is one which upholds
the right to compensation, both for temporary and for permanent
disability.
It seems clear that a construction contrary to that enunciated
by the court would be reversing the trend of current legislative
history reflecting constant enlargement, rather than curtailment,
15 53 N. M. 249, 205 P. 2d. 834 (1949).
16 Material portions of the act prior to amendment, N. M. STAT. ANN. 1929 Comp.
§ 156-118, read as follows: "Compensation for all classes of injuries shall run con-
secutively and not concurrently as follows: 'Surgical, medical and hospital services
and medicines, as provided in this paragraph. After the first seven days, compensa-
tion during temporary disability. Following both, either or none of the above, com-
pensation consecutively for each permanent injury. Following any or all or none of the
above, if death results from the accident, funeral expenses as hereinbefore provided
following which compensation to dependents, if any." As amended the statute now
reads, "Compensation for all classes of injuries shall run consecutively and not con.
currently as follows: Surgical, medical and hospital services and medicines, as pro-
vided in this paragraph. After the first seven days, compensation during temporary
disability. Following both, either or none of above, if death results from accident,
funeral expenses as hereinbefore provided following which compensation to depend.
ents, if any." N. M. Laws 1937, c. 92, § 10; N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. § 57-919.
17 Now raised to twenty-five dollars.
18 The position of defendant's counsel on this claim may best be summed up in
language taken from their reply brief: "[Claimant can] recover for the temporary
disability and for the permanent disability, provided that the time given for tempo-
rary disability is deducted from the time given for permanent disability, as such would
mean, in effect, just one award."
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of benefits to injured employees under compensation acts.'9 A
Wyoming case, In Re McConnel,2" which had substantially the same
facts as the principal case, set forth what is probably the general
rule: an award may be made for temporary disability, and, when
that disability has terminated, if a permanent partial disability
has resulted from the injury, then allowance will be made of an
additional award.
COMPROMISE SETTLEMENTS-MAXIMUM AWARD OBTAINABLE
GOVERNS JURISDICTION OF COURT
Texas. The court in Branon v. Pacific Employer's Insurance
Co." set at rest any question concerning the jurisdiction of the
courts in cases filed to set aside compromise agreements approved
by the Industrial Accident Board. The injured employee had set-
tled his claim for $215 but later sued to set aside the settlement
on grounds of fraud, alleging that his injury had resulted in total
and permanent disability for which he was entitled to maximum
compensation.2 The insurance carrier contended that the court
did not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter inasmuch as it
involved only $215. It was held that jurisdiction in such a case
was governed by the amount of compensation that could be recov-
ered by an injured employee in the event that the compromise
settlement was set aside.
Approval by the Industrial Accident Board of a compromise
agreement is not an award of compensation,23 nor an order deny-
ing compensation, and, therefore, the board has no authority to
set aside a compromise settlement or its order approving the
same. Consequently, the power of the courts to set aside such an
agreement for fraud is not derived from the Workmen's Compen-
19 See Curtis v. Hayes Wheel Co.. 211 Mich. 260, 178 N. W. 675 (1920) ; 71 C. J.,
Workmen's Compensation Acts, 830; 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's Compensation, 786.
20 45 Wyo. 289. 18 P. 2d. 629 (1933).
21- Tex.- , 224 S. W. 2d. 466 (1949).
22 TEx. REtv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon. 1948) art. 8306. § 10.
23 Lumberman's Reciprocal Assn. v. Day, 17 S. W. 2d. 1043 (Tex. Com. App. 1929).
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sation Act but is asserted by virtue of the Constitution and statutes
defining their jurisdiction. A court is the only forum to which an
aggrieved party can resort.24 In cases of this kind the court has
no power to grant or deny compensation but only the power to
pass upon the question whether the compromise agreement should
be set aside or upheld.25
If the injured employee herein prevailed in his contention that
the compromise agreement was invalid, then he would have the
right to go back to the Industrial Accident Board and pursue his
claim for total and permanent disability benefits, which would
entitle him to recover $10,025. The sum of $10,025, less the
$215 paid on the compromise, was the amount in controversy be-
tween the parties since that was the claim the insurance carrier
was denying. The sum of $215 which was paid in consideration
of the release was in no sense the amount in controversy between
the parties since the injured employee was not claiming that he
was entitled to this sum. The real controversy was the claimant's
contention that he was entitled to an additional $9,810.
Where the same question of jurisdiction as in the instant case
was raised, the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals held the district
court had jurisdiction.2" It would seem, then, that the jurisdictional
amount is to be determined not by the sum involved in the com-
promise agreement but by the difference in amount between that
which the workman might be entitled under compensation law and
that which the workman received under the settlement
DUAL CAPACITY OF EXECUTIVE AND EMPLOYEE
Arkansas. Whether an executive acting in a dual capacity may
be counted as an employee in determining the jurisdiction of a
24 Traders and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 127 Tex. 322, 94 S. W. 2d. 134 (1936);
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 126 Tex. 497, 87 S. W. 2d. 1081 (1935); Gibson
v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 131 S. W. 2d. 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939),
writ of error refused; Wood v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 82 S. W. 2d. 421 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935), writ of error re/used; Lumbermen's Reciprocal Association v. Hen-
derson. 15 S. W. 2d. 565 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
25 Tex. Employers' Ins. Assn. v. Kennedy, 135 Tex. 486, 143 S. W. 2d. 583 (1940).
21857 S. W. 2d. 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), writ of error refused; see 45 Tex. Jar.,
Workmen's Compensation, see. 244; 21 C. J. S., Courts, sec. 54, note 80.
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Workman's Compensation Commission had been an undecided
question until the case of Brook's Inc. v. Claywell.27 At the time
the employee was injured, the Commission held that, excluding
the executive, there were not five regular employees, although
that finding might have been made upon the authority of Green v.
Benedict.2" But the commission held that the compensation act 9
was applicable upon its finding that the executive himself was an
employee. The basis for that finding was that the executive often
helped the other employees, lifting cases and boxes, sweeping
out the store, and doing other manual jobs.
The court held: (a) in determining whether one is an employee
or an independent contractor, the compensation act is to be
given a liberal construction in favor of the workman, and
any doubt is to be resolved in favor of his status as an employee
rather than as an independent contractor; 30 (b) the same liberal
rule should be applied in determining whether the executive was
also an employee; (c) when so applied, the testimony supports
the finding that the executive was also an employee. The follow-
ing language in a leading text 1 vividly highlights the issue and
has been cited with approval in a number of jurisdictions:32
"While in all ordinary transactions the existence of a relation of con-
tractor as between two given persons excludes that of principal and
agent, or master and servant, there is not necessarily such a repugnance
27 -Ark.- . 224 S. W. 2d. 37 (1949).
28 102 Conn. 1. 128 Atl. 20 (1925).
29 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 81-1302(c) provides that employment means "every
employment carried on in the State in which five or more employees are regularly
employed in the same business or establishment ...." Texas has enacted that officers
cannot be employees, TEX. REV. Cv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 8309, sec. la: "The
president, vice-president or vice presidents, secretary or other officers thereof pro-
vided in its charter or by-laws and the directors of any corporation which is a sub-
scriber to this law shall not be deemed or held to be an employee within the meaning
of that term as defined in the preceding section hereof, and this notwithstanding they
may hold other offices in the corporation and may perform other duties and render
other services for which they receive a salary."
30 Irwan v. Bounds, 205 Ark. 752, 170 S. W. 2d. 674 (1943) ; Parker Stave Co. v.
Hines, 209 Ark. 438, 190 S. W. 2d. 620 (1945) ; see 71 C. J. 449.
51 4 ScHNEIma's WORKuMEN'S COMPENSATION (Perm. Ed. 1941) § 1076.
32 Soltz Machinery & Supply Co. v. McGehee, 208 Ark. 747, 187 S. W. 2d. 896 (1945).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW IOURNAL
between them that they cannot exist together, and an employee may
be an independent contractor as to certain work, and yet be a mere
servant as to other work for the same employer. '3
Perhaps the proper conclusion to be drawn is that under the
rule of liberal construction and in the absence of a statutory
provision to the contrary, executives who perform the work of
employees will be brought within the coverage of workmen's
compensation.
SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES: 1949
Arkansas.34 A. Maximum payments were raised from $20 to
$25, provided compensation is not to exceed 65 per cent of the
average weekly wage or 450 weeks of disability or $8,000."5
B. Payment of compensation for disablement or death as a
result of silicosis or asbestosis, even though there is a waiver of
such compensation, was raised from $2,000 to $2,500.36
C. The time within which to file for compensation before
the claim is barred was increased from one year to two, either
(a) from the date of the accident or (b) from the date of the
last injurious exposure to disease or infection."
D. The time within which to file an application for review
of an award of the Workmen's Compensation Commission was
raised from fourteen days to thirty.38
8s In the case of In re Raynes, 66 Ind. App. 321, 118 N. E. 387, 391 (1917), it was
said: "If the corporation is great and powerful, with extensive financial resources;
if an officer is a large stockholder and his time is occupied in discharge of such duties
-it would seem apparent that he could not be regarded as an employee under such
an act. But in another corporation of humbler proportions such official duties would
constitute but a small portion of services rendered by him to the corporation. Such
an officer might be hired in fact to perform manual labor in connection with other
employees, and his time in main be occupied in performing such service and regular
wages paid him accordingly. Such an official in his capacity as workman might measure
up in all respects to the conception of an employee within the meaning of the act as
we hereinbefore developed it, and in such capacity we believe that he should be
regarded as an employee within the meaning of 'the Compensation Act."
a4 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. §§ 81-1301--81-1349.
80 Id. (1949 Cum. Supp.) § 81-1310.
36 Id. § 81.1314-5.
37 Id. § 81-1318a.
3s Id. §81-1323b.
[Vol. 4
1950] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1949 373
New Mexico.39 A. Extra-territorial coverage was provided."
B. Maximum benefits were increased from $18 to $25, and
the minimum payments from $10 to $12.
C. Funeral expenses were increased from $150 to $250.
D. The allowances for special fees and for hospital expenses
were increased from $100 to $150 and from $50 to $150,
respectively."
The extra-territorial provision stipulates that if an employee
is hired or regularly employed in New Mexico and receives an
accidental injury in the course of employment outside the state,
and the injury occurs within six months after leaving New Mexico
(longer if notice has been given the State Labor Industrial Com-
mission that he elects to extend his coverage), then he is entitled
to recover compensation. However, an employee who has been
hired outside New Mexico and his employer are exempt from
the provision while the employee is temporarily working within
the state.
Texas. The only change in the Workmen's Compensation Act42
authorized counties to provide for compensation for county em-
ployees and their representatives and beneficiaries for personal
injuries sustained in the course of employment and for deaths
resulting therefrom. The amendment provided: (a) a county
could be either self-insuring or could purchase Workmen's Com-
pensation Insurance from any company authorized to do business
in Texas; (b) compensation coverage is permissive and not man-
datory; (c) the commissioners court of the county may by proper
order put into effect the\provisions of this act.43
Oklahoma." Maximum and minimum payments were in-
creased from $18 and $8 to $25 and $15, respectively.45
B. The organization of the State Industrial Commission was
89 N. M. STAT. 1941 ANN. §§ 57-901--57-981.
40 N. M. Laws 1949, c. 14, § 1.
41 Id. C. 51, § 1-7.
42 Trx. Rav. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 8306-8309a.
43 Texas Acts 1949. c. 428; Tr x. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon. 1950) art. 8309c.
44 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) Title 85.
5 85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Penn. Ed.) § 22. 71.
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changed as follows: (1) the number of commissioners was in-
creased from three to five; (2) their terms of office were reduced
from six years to four; (3) residence qualifications of the com-
missioners were increased from two years next preceding appoint-
ment to five years; (4) age qualifications were lowered from thirty
years to twenty-five for all members of the commission, except
the chairman, who still must be at least thirty years of age; (5)
the added requirement was made that the chairman and at least
two other members of the commission shall be regularly, licensed
attorneys in Oklahoma for at least five years next preceding their
initial appointments; (6) salaries of members of the commission
were raised from $3,900 per annum to $7,200, and the salary
of the chairman was raised from $4,200 to $7,500.
T. Michael Kostos.
